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Nevertheless, it is something of an achievement to give the gist of the Spencerian philosophy in just over a hundred small octavo pages, and this is the task that Dr. Schwarze has undertaken, and has successfully performed, in the book before us.

The frontispiece is a reproduction of the well-known portrait taken when the philosopher was seventy-eight. The introduction (1-18) gives a biographical sketch of Spencer's career. The synthetic philosophy is then taken up book by book (18-125): first the general philosophical foundations of the system (18-35), then the Biology (35-55), the Psychology (55-76), the Sociology (77-99), and the Ethics (99-125). The style is interesting, and the abstracting is competently done. A critical conclusion (125-131) seeks to place Spencer in correct philosophical perspective. Epistemologically, he is akin to Kant, the Unknowable corresponding to the *Ding an sich*. Metaphysically, he represents a pantheism like that of Spinoza. His dualistic standpoint recalls the Wundtian doctrine of physical and psychical causality. The finality which he claims for his systematization reminds us of Hegel, and the fate of the two systems is the same. On the whole it must be said that Spencer has left his philosophy a torso. If we carry out the figure of a statue, Spencer's systematized science is the trunk, and the trunk only. There should be a head, epistemology; but Spencer offers us in its place ethics, and an ethics that is incomplete because worked out one-sidedly from the naturalistic standpoint. There should be limbs; but Spencer provides nothing more than conjectures as to the future of the race, and these conjectures cannot support his science. His fame will therefore depend upon his scientific, not upon his strictly philosophical accomplishment.

L. TURLEY.

Psychologie de l'enfant et pédagogie expérimentale. Par ÉD. CLAPARÈDE. Deuxième édition, revue et augmentée, avec 9 figures. Genève, Librairie Kündig. 1909. pp. viii., 283.

This is the second edition of a little work published in 1905. The author, taking interest as the fundamental principle of mental activity, has sought to orientate the teacher in the field of child-psychology and experimental pedagogy. The exposition is extremely orderly and systematic; every chapter classifies and classifies again; indeed, the book may be considered as a sort of subject-index of problems and methods, made out in the service of the doctrine of interest.

The introduction, entitled *Psychologie et Pédagogie*, holds the balance between those who affirm that psychology is everything, and those who declare that it is nothing, for the teacher. The views of Stanley Hall, James and Münsterberg are cited and discussed. The author concludes that "even if the teacher has entirely forgotten his psychology, it is worth his while to have been, at the outset of his career, a sound psychologist."

Chapter i. consists of an *Aperçu historique*. Professor Claparède remarks that there does not exist, to his knowledge, a work which sets forth in detail the history of the modern pedagogical movement. Such a work is undoubtedly needed, and the author's chapter furnishes a useful beginning in this direction.

Chapter ii. treats of *Les problèmes*. Practical pedagogy has a four-fold aim: the preservation of health, intellectual and physical exercise (*gymnastique*), the furnishing of memory, and education in the strict sense of the term. The aim of education, strictly considered, is to establish character, to stimulate ambition, to develop will and personality. Here then are the problems of modern pedagogy, classified from the point of view of subject-matter. If we take another point of view, that of their relation to practice (*portée pragmatique*), the prob-

lems fall into two great groups as theoretical and practical, problems of pure and of applied psychology; and the second group divides again into problems of psychognostics and problems of psychotechnics. What are the laws of memory? that is a question for pure psychology. How may we measure the capacity of memory in the individual case? that is a question of psychognostics. What is the best method of memorizing a text in a given time? that is a question of psychotechnics. Lastly, if we classify by reference to results, the problems may be grouped under the headings general and special, the latter covering such things as mental type, correlation of traits in the individual mind, etc.

Chapter iii. treats, in the same way, of *Les méthodes*. If we classify by reference to the character of the observed phenomena, we have the methods of introspection and of extrospection. (The latter term is better than Binet's externospection; but there seems to be no reason for coining it; we already have the word inspection for external observation.) Reference to the general conditions of investigation gives us the distinction of observation and experiment. Reference to the procedures employed in assembling data gives us the distinction of individual and collective methods. Reference to the nature of the subject-matter gives us four types of method: the normal, the genetic, the comparative, and the pathological. Lastly, reference to the technique of our inquiry gives us the distinction of qualitative or descriptive and quantitative or psychometrical methods.

Chapter iv. discusses *Le Développement mental*. The primary question is: What is childhood for? To answer it we must first examine the phenomena of physical growth, and the reaction of growth upon the mental functions. This leads to the study of two functions of cardinal importance: play and imitation. Many theories of play have been formulated: the theory of recreation, of superfluity of energy, of atavism, of preparatory activity. The author inclines to a biological theory which combines the views of Groos and of Carr. Play may be classified as general and special. The former may be subdivided into sensory, motor and psychical; and psychical play subdivides again into intellectual and emotive. Special play takes five principal forms: rivalry, pursuit, social play, family play, and imitative play. Imitation, on its side, leads to acquisitions of two kinds, general and special. The general functions acquired by imitation are motor adaptation, voluntary movement and comprehension. The special functions are too numerous to list; we may mention language, and in the moral sphere the power of example. Now we may answer the question: What is childhood for? by replying: For playing and for imitating. But this means that education must be attractive. "En réclamant de l'enfant un effort de travail fondé sur autre chose que sur le jeu, on agit comme cet insensé qui, dès le printemps, secouerait un pommier pour lui faire donner des pommes." So we are led to investigate the psychobiological value of interest. The child passes through a number of stages, which follow each other in constant order; every stage corresponds to the ripening of a certain function or aptitude whose exercise is agreeable. Thus we have perceptual interests, linguistic interests, general intellectual interests, special interests, social or moral interests, which appear in the order given. The secret of pedagogy is to avail oneself of these aptitudes or functions, and to invite their activity by presenting to the child the objects which appeal to them; it is worse than useless to blame the child for the absence of something which, biologically, he does not and as yet cannot possess.

Chapter v. is entitled *La Fatigue intellectuelle*. Fatigue may be measured, first, by reduction of capacity. Here we have the methods

of dictation, of counting letters, of addition, of copying letters, of combination. It may be measured, secondly, by measurement of the changes which it induces in various functions. Here we have the methods of esthesiometry, of algesimetry, of dynamometry, of tapping. Fatigue is itself conditioned upon age, sex, intelligence, individual type, season of the year, time of day, habit, training and interest, change of work, bodily posture, alimentary regimen (alcohol). The various subjects of study have different ponogenic coefficients. Physical exercise is decidedly ponogenic: hence educational gymnastics should be placed in the morning, hygienic gymnastics at the end of the schoolday. Fatigue offers a number of problems: the relation between objective and subjective fatigue, the relation between the physiological state of fatigue and power of effective work, the influence of will or interest on fatigue as physiological condition, the seat of mental fatigue, habituation to fatigue, the normal or abnormal character of fatigue, overwork or chronic exhaustion. These problems still await detailed study. Something may be said, however, in the light of our present knowledge. Thus, the idea of a reserve of energy throws light on various observations: on the dynamogenic value of certain stimuli, on the oscillation of work-curves, on the difference between fatigue and lassitude, on the effect of change of work, on sudden bursts of activity, on Janet's lowering of the mental tension. Overwork, again, seems to be due not to the amount or even to the difficulty of the work assigned, but to its nature; work of an inferior psychological kind is especially likely to induce it. Rest should be taken as soon as ever the signs of fatigue show themselves, though prevention is better than cure. The normal duration of the rest-period has not yet been determined. The best way to rest is to do nothing; and the best way to do nothing is to sleep.

Such, in outline, are the contents of the book. Every chapter has appended to it a selected bibliography.

W. JENKINS.

The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century. By JOSEPH LOUIS PERRIER, Ph. D. New York, The Columbia University Press. 1909. pp. viii., 344. Price \$1.75.

"One of the movements that have excited the interest of the world of thought in the nineteenth century had been the revival of Scholasticism. The philosophy of the Middle Ages had been for centuries past buried in deepest oblivion. . . . Suddenly, to the astonishment of all, Scholasticism has awaked from its slumber. It has appeared again in the face of the world, has been accepted by great minds, has been expounded and defended by powerful writers, and has given rise to a great number of interesting philosophical works. Its admirers have even tried, not only to prove its congruity with modern scientific results, but to show that it is the only system capable of explaining them." These sentences stand at the beginning of the Introduction of the work before us. As to the reasons for the scholastic revival, the author sums them up as follows. "An honest endeavor to seek the true philosophy in modern systems had been made for several centuries. But, from a Catholic standpoint, this endeavor had completely failed. . . . The more recent systems, Materialism, Kantism, Hegelianism, Positivism, were opposed to the Catholic faith. The influence of these systems had led many Catholics to advance dangerous theories. . . . Was it not better to return frankly to the philosophy which had reigned for centuries in the schools, . . . to find out whether the old Scholastic philosophy was not the true system? . . . Such is, in my judgment, the fundamental idea which inspired the neo-Thomists."

Neo-Scholasticism is, then, a philosophy thought out in conformity with Roman Catholic theology. Dr. Perrier has set himself a twofold